The development of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Economic Community (EEC), and the collapse of the former communist countries, has caused a urry of international banking, trading and investment activities in the recent years. However, the problem with international banking is that, despite the existence of the US Federal Reserve System, following the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, and equivalent central (or reserve) banks in other countries such as Canada, France, Germany, India, Japan, Switzerland, and United Kingdom, an equivalent central (or reserve) bank system for the world has never been established by the United Nations (UN). Banks around the world use a variety of techniques to settle payments, utilizing strategic alliances, local arrangements, limited credits, loss-sharing arrangements, and collaterals in the form of US Treasury Notes. This invariably results in arbitrary delays of often months and lost interest, su ered by users engaged in international business. Furthermore, as the number of international transactions multiply, the weakness of the current method of batch-mode transaction processing, employed by the central banks of the world's nations, begin to magnify. Such weaknesses include the (i) increased vulnerability, i.e. stress on the payment system leading to nancial crisis, of a single central bank, (ii) arbitrary delays, associated with each transaction processing, and (iii) the lack of e cient scalability of the current banking system. For the bene t of the world economy in which every country is a bona de participant, this paper argues that it is imperative to create an international federal reserve banking system. This paper introduces a novel architecture for asynchronous, hierarchical, international, geographically distributed, realtime banking, NOVAHID. NOVAHID is organized as a hierarchical approach. This paper assumes that, for economic, cultural, and geo-political reasons, the world's nations may be organized into unique and autonomous entities, termed groups. The lower level of the hierarchy consists of discrete \group-networks" where each group-network is synthesized from the equivalent Federal Reserve banking nodes of the nations served by the group-network. At the highest level of the hierarchy, representative entities of the groups are interconnected through a \top-level-network." The speed of local transaction processing, i.e. within a group-network, is likely to be much faster than the processing of international transactions that involve two group-networks and the top-level-network. The hierarchy re ects the underlying assumption that a signi cant fraction of all transactions are local to the group-networks and a relatively smaller fraction of all transactions transcend group boundaries. At its core, NOVAHID utilizes the principles of YADDES which embodies the principle of asynchronous, discrete event simulation algorithm for cyclic circuits and mathematically guarantees the accuracy of the execution of events. Each banking transaction may be modeled as an event in discrete event simulation. NOVAHID guarantees the accuracy of every transaction and, hence, the accurate balance of every account at all times. That is, at any node, a transaction at time t 1 , relative to a given account, is executed only when no other outstanding transactions in the system may a ect the state of the given account prior to time t 1 . This guarantee takes into account the assertion time of transactions and processing delays at the banking nodes, and requires that nodes within a group be connected through a logical ring. As a result, banks will no longer be exposed to the risk of fraudulent or bad credits, and users are not denied complete access to their most recent balances. Unlike batch-mode processing, where no new transactions may be introduced after the normal operation hours so that accuracy in book-keeping may be maintained, NOVAHID o ers to any user, perhaps, for the rst time, the banking privileges of withdrawal, deposit, and transfer anywhere and at any time in the world. This paper also describes a model and implementation of NOVAHID on a 2 loosely-coupled parallel processor. Performance measures, obtained from simulating a few representative international banking networks, as a function of the number and composition of transactions and network complexity, are also reported. This approach is in the early stages and the authors hope to initiate a debate among engineering, computer science, computational science, and nancial communities concerning the international banking needs and solutions to the problem.
Introduction
The payments processing mechanism in most industrial nations resemble that utilized by the US Federal Reserve System, with minor di erences regarding the role of the central bank. As mandated by the US Congress, the US Federal Reserve maintains the dual roles of (i) operation and competition and (ii) regulating the payment system 9]. In France, the central bank, equivalent of the US Federal Reserve System, plays a major operational role in the payment system on behalf of the banking system. It provides the payment infrastructure. In Canada and United Kingdom, payment processing is largely carried out by private enterprises and the central bank simply coordinates the governing body constituted from the members of the nancial sector and provides its books for settlement 2]. In addition, each nation adheres to its own notion of of daylight overdrafts, which refers to an intra-day extension of credit by the central bank to a participating institution such that payment instructions of an account holder are honored even though there are insu cient balances available in the account to fund the transaction at the time it is made. In the United States, daylight overdrafts are permitted generously to the tune of $70 billion, at no charge, although measures to charge a fee for use are being considered by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors 9] . In Switzerland, the SIC 7] system eliminated the daylight overdraft system completely. In Japan 9], the central bank provides no daily overdrafts while private markets are permitted to provide for intra-day liquidity. Given such di erences in the payment systems of di erent nations, it is logical to expect the lack of a uniform international payment processing system, as noted by Summers 9] . Thus, despite an average daily foreign exchange turnover of at least $650 billion, neither a uniform scheme nor a currency have been standardized for inter-country payments.
In general, international payments, under open account terms in the banking system, can take place in one of the two following categories: funds transfer and negotiable instruments. In addition, funds transfer includes the submodes of cable transfer and mail payment order, while negotiable instruments may assume the form of bank drafts and business checks. The basic mechanics of the international payment procedures are identical for all of the four payment methods. Contrary to uninformed expectation, the currency involved in the payments do not actually move across the international borders. Rather, the payments are made via book-keeping entries to the \demand deposit" accounts that the corresponding banks in di erent nations maintain with each other. In general, in any given country, only the largest banks, i.e. those with substantial international presence, maintain foreign currency accounts with foreign banks. For example, Citibank of New York maintains a British Sterling account with Barclays of London, while Barclays of London, in turn, maintains a US dollar account with Citibank of New York. Foreign currency accounts held by US banks in foreign banks are called nostros accounts (\our" account with other banks), while dollar accounts maintained by foreign banks in US banks are termed vostro accounts (\your" account with US) 1]. International banking privileges, however, are not limited only to the large international banks. Smaller regional banks may also access international banking privilege, at the cost of further intermediation, through the following mechanism. Consider, for example, that user A maintains an account (say 1) at Last National Bank at Anytown, USA, and wishes to make a deposit of $1M to his/her daughter's account (say 2) at Barclays Bank in London. Under the current batch-mode transaction processing scheme, such a transaction is queued for settlement rst at the national level, i.e. through the US Federal Reserve system, and then at the international level 1]. At the end of the current business day and prior to the following business day, when all the US banks are \o -line," the transaction amount { $1M, is subtracted from the reserve account that Last National Bank at Anytown, USA, maintains with its local Federal Reserve Bank. This transaction is then relayed to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York where a credit is placed for Citibank. Then, Citibank settles the transaction though issuing a credit to its nostros account with Barclays Bank. Upon receipt of credit from Citibank, Barclays issues a credit to the destination account 2 corresponding to the transaction. Barclays Bank, a foreign bank, is not permitted to maintain a reserve account with the United States Federal Reserve System. With the batch-mode scheme, the multi-stage processing for international transactions are not initiated until the end of the business day. In addition, the exact time required for the completion of all of the steps depends (i) largely on the location of the originating and destining accounts and (ii) whether the banks are members of a private clearing network. In New York, for example, there exists a private clearing house, CHIPS (Clearing House Inter-Bank Payments systems), which is a network of major international banks. CHIPS is operated by the New York Clearing House Association and it maintains an account with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Members of CHIPS settle transactions between themselves at the end of the day and those banks with a net debit request the Federal Reserve to shift a part of the funds from their reserve holdings to the CHIPS account. Foreign banks that are not served by the Federal Reserve system normally acquire lines of credit from other members of CHIPS that are served by the Federal Reserve. Where both the payer, i.e. depositor of a transaction, and the payee, i.e. creditor of the transaction, hold accounts with banks that are a part of the CHIPS network, settlement of a payment may take place within a day 3]. Otherwise, settlement of international payments may vary from several days to weeks and months depending on the payment clearance facilities available to the individual banks involved.
As the volume of transactions multiply, the credit extended by the Federal Reserve System often exceed billions of dollars and occasional glitches such as power failures or computer error compound to create extreme nancial risks. This was exempli ed by the Bank of New York (BONY) incident 2] that led to the largest overnight loan from the discount window at a value of $22.6 billion. In this case, the culprit was a computer program which somehow failed to accommodate an unusual large volume of transactions. BONY lost several million dollar in the form of interest payments from the overnight loan. It has been estimated 11] that the size of the foreign exchange market may be approximated by an average daily turnover of $650 billion. The traditional settlement practices for foreign exchange contracts present special risks 10] since the payments and counterpayments are settled at di erent times in di erent countries.
Thus, the drawbacks of batch-mode processing include the risk reliance on daylight overdraft, the risk borne even by the payee from daylight overdrafts, and the denial of immediate access to the funds from transactions. In addition, the current scheme relies heavily on (i) the assumption of trust which, often, translates into speci ed limits placed on withdrawal, (ii) the deposit of collateral in the form of US Treasury Bills and others, and (iii) explicit loss-sharing arrangements between the participating banks as in the case of the Chase Manhattan Bank, Tokyo, that serves the Japanese and Asian interbank markets. As a speci c example, consider the Chase Manhattan Bank in Tokyo 10] that operates a dollar clearing arrangement to serve the Asian and Japanese interbank markets. Operating during the Tokyo business day ahead of the US markets, Chase will enact debits and credits to its customers, at levels set by predetermined limits, throughout the day. Evidently, only those user who are Chase customers bene t from this arrangement and this underscores the need for a more open international payments processing scheme, one that is easily accessible by any citizen of the world. The inherent risk, borne by the payer bank may be understood as follows. Consider that Bank A has transferred a billion dollars to Bank B. While, the Federal Reserve issues a daylight overdraft on behalf of Bank A as a credit to Bank B, the billion dollars is not available to Bank B until the end of the day. Meanwhile, the billion dollars remains an asset to Bank A which may use it for short term lending purposes. The risk associated with this business decision is now borne not only by Bank A but Bank B as well as the Federal Reserve System. Ghosh 6] proposed an asynchronous, distributed, approach to payments processing, NOVADIB, and modeled the United States Federal Reserve System. The banking process is mathematically mapped to a discrete-event simulation system with feedback loops wherein deposits, withdrawals, and transfers are modeled as events that are introduced into the system asynchronously i.e., at irregular intervals of time. The initiation of a transaction is analogous to the creation of an event. The NOVADIB 6] algorithm is based on the principles of asynchronous, distributed, discrete-event simulation algorithm for cyclic circuits, YADDES 4] , and mathematically guarantees the accuracy of every transaction. While NOVADIB achieves its aim of an integrated, real-time payments processing scheme for the United States Federal Reserve, it is limited. In NOVADIB 6], the Federal Reserve banks are connected through a single ring architecture which while adequate for the United States, is inappropriate for an international payments processing system. First, merely expanding the ring to include the equivalent federal reserve banks of other nations may ultimately fail to deliver real-time performance. Second, from genuine concerns to protect privacy and other geo-political reasons, the world's nations may desire to exercise some form of localized control. Third, it is generally agreed that a signi cant number of transactions within a nation are local and only a relatively small fraction of transactions cross a nation's boundary. Therefore, the underlying single ring architecture of NOVADIB 6] may not be the logical choice. This paper proposes a new architecture for international banking, NOVAHID. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the details on the NOVAHID approach while section 3 describes a model of a representative, international banking model consisting of three group-networks, and its operation. Section 4 describes the implementation details of NOVAHID and also reports the performance results. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.
The NOVAHID Approach
The design of the NOVAHID architecture takes into account the following premises { (i) a signi cant fraction of all transactions are local, (ii) it is logical and e cient to o er higher throughput rate for local, i.e. national, transactions and relatively lower rate for international transactions, and (iii) nations would prefer to exercise individualized control over their respective domestic transactions. For e ciency and recognizing that many nations may lack the nancial resources and infrastructure to participate individually in an international payments processing system, the NOVAHID architecture assumes that the world's nations are organized into a nite number of groups, where the formation of a group by the member nations is motivated by proximity, geography, population, size of the economy, cultural ties, and other geo-political reasons. A possible list of groups may include the United States, Mexico coupled with the Central American countries and the Atlantic Islands, Latin American countries, Japan and the Asian Paci c Rim countries, Australia and New Zealand, European Economic Community, Russia and the countries under the former Soviet Block, countries of the middle east, North African countries, South African countries, China, India, countries of south east Asia, etc. It is estimated that the list of groups will number approximately 15-20. NOVAHID aims at an international banking network that will extend (i) real-time transaction processing capability to any group in the world and (ii) real-time access to any account in any group, through the use of an asynchronous, hierarchical, distributed algorithm.
The NOVAHID architecture is organized as a two-layered hierarchy. At the lowest level of the hierarchy are the individual networks for the groups. Every group-network consists of a number of equivalent Federal Reserve Banking nodes that utilize the NOVADIB 6] algorithm. Thus, the (i) banking nodes are asynchronous, autonomous, and concurrent, and guarantee the accuracy of every transaction and (ii) the nodes are connected through a ring. It may be pointed out that, although the use of the ring architecture ensures the accuracy of every transaction, the banking nodes need not be physically connected through a ring. The proof of accuracy 5] 6] of every transaction only requires that the nodes be connected through a logical ring, i.e. through software links (protocols). The group-networks, in turn, are independent, autonomous, and concurrent. The only form of communication between the group-networks is through messages that embodies international transactions. The NOVADIB 6] study reveals that the performance of the algorithm is scalable up to 16-20 nodes. Given that the United States has one of the largest economies, is one of the largest countries in terms of geography, and is able to meet the payments processing demands through the use of only 12 Federal Reserve banks, it is reasonable to assume that the groups will be limited to 12-15 equivalent Federal Reserve banking nodes. This will ensure that the transaction throughputs in the group-networks are high, thereby delivering real-time processing for the intra-group transactions. Every group-network designates an entity to serve as its interface with the outside world. This entity may either be one of the equivalent Federal Reserve banking nodes of the group-network or a completely separate entity. It maintains the aggregate nancial holdings of all banks that are served by the group-network. This entity is connected directly to every node of the group-network. At the top level of the NOVAHID hierarchy, the designated entities of the di erent groups are connected through a ring network and subject also to the NOVADIB 6] algorithm. Although international transactions originate in the group-networks, they are eventually asserted at the top-level-network by the group-network where the transaction originates. The NOVADIB algorithm at the top-level-network executes these transactions in an independent, asynchronous, and concurrent manner.
Thus, given an organization of say 15 groups, the NOVAHID approach consists of a total of 16 instances of the NOVADIB 6] algorithm executing the 15 group-networks and the top-level-network, independently and asynchronously. For a group-network, external transactions are asserted at the equivalent Federal Reserve banking nodes either by local customers or by the the top-level-network. Local transactions are processed by NOVADIB within the group-network such that causality, i.e. the time order, of the transaction-events is preserved. International transactions that are asserted by the group-networks to the top-level-network, are viewed by the NOVADIB algorithm at the top-level as input transactions and are executed based on their times of assertion at the top-level-network.
Consider the following example. Figure 1 illustrates a simple, representative model based on the NOVAHID approach. The model consists of three groups and, for simplicity, they are chosen to be United States, United Kingdom, and Japan, each of which is served by only two equivalent Federal Reserve banks, termed as group-nodes in this paper. Assume, for simplicity, that the group-networks for USA, UK, and Japan consist of the group-nodes fNew York, Philadelphiag, fLondon, Glasgowg, and fTokyo, Kyotog respectively. Thus, the lower level of the hierarchy consists of three unique group-networks, one for each of USA, UK, and Japan. The top-level-network consists of three entities, termed Int-Nodes, each of which are connected to the nodes of the corresponding group-network. While each of the group-nodes within a group-network maintain reserve account balances of all of the banks serviced by the group-network, every Int-Node maintains the aggregate account balances for all of the groups. In this paper, a transaction asserted either at a group-node or Int-Node, is synonymously termed as an event. One such event may be asserted at a group-node of a group either (i) by one of the regional banks, served by the group-network, (ii) from another group-node within the group-network, or (iii) by its Int-node corresponding to an international transaction asserted at a di erent group-network. The event received, say E Aj Ai , where Ai and Aj denote the payee and payer banks respectively, may not always be executed immediately. This may be necessary to ensure that all events are executed chronologically. Consider two events { E Aj
Ai and E Aj Ak , introduced into the system at two distinct nodes N 1 and N 2 of a group-network at time instants given by t = t 1 and t = t 2 respectively. While both transactions a ect the same payer bank, A j , it is necessary to preserve the logical order of the transactions. Since events are generated asynchronously, i.e. irregularly in time, and as the propagation of messages may experience arbitrary delays, the lack of enforcing the correct logical order of execution may result in serious accounting errors. The logical order of events may be determined as follows. Where t 1 < t 2 , and the subsequent execution of E Aj Ai at N 1 results in the propagation of an event to N 2 at time t = t 3 , where t 3 < t 2 , then execution of E Aj Ak at N 2 must be deferred until the event propagated from N 1 is received and executed at N 2 . In the case where t 1 = t 2 , however, both transactions may be executed simultaneously. Furthermore, where the subsequent event caused by execution of E Aj Ai at N 1 is at t = t 4 , and t 4 > t 2 , then the execution of E Aj Ak at N 2 is deferred only until E Aj Ai has been executed and the subsequent event is propagated and received at a di erent group-node in the group-network. NOVAHID inherits the general philosophy of YADDES 4] in that events are executed consistent with the increasing order of their assertion times and an event E i at t = t 6 is executed at a node, N r , only when the execution of no other transaction in the NOVAHID network may cause a new event at N r at time t = t 7 such that t 7 < t 6 . In the absence of global knowledge of all transactions introduced into the NOVAHID network, and where each group-node receives a distinct set of external transactions, the conservative nature of the NOVADIB 6] algorithm guarantees that all transactions are executed in the same logical order in which they are asserted at either a group-network or the top-level-network. It is reasonable to expect that due to the extremely high volume of transactions in the system and the uniformity of the number of transactions at all group-nodes of all groups, at any instant of time, at least one transactions will be available for execution at every group-node. Thus, every group-node will continuously process payments implying e ciency through concurrent processing.
It is noted that, in the present banking culture, often a transaction may be deliberately executed out of logical order, in an attempt to maximize the number of transactions processed. That is, a bank may \bump" a big check to clear a number of smaller checks. Conceivably, transactions in NOVAHID may be additionally characterized by priorities, etc. to address such cultural issues. The NOVAHID approach is in the early stages and the authors hope to initiate a debate among engineering, computer science, computational science, and nancial communities concerning the international banking needs and solutions to the problem.
The NOVAHID Algorithm
In the NOVAHID architecture, each of the group-networks and the top-level-network are executed by a unique instance of the NOVADIB 6] algorithm. Although the executable behaviors of the di erent instances of the NOVADIB 6] algorithm are identical, the results of their executions are di erent due to their unique input stimulus, position of the network within the hierarchy, i.e. whether it is a group-network or top-level-network, and the topology of the network. In addition, the instances are asynchronous and concurrent and they interact through messages that encapsulate international transactions. A brief motivation for and a description of the essential components of NOVADIB are presented here to facilitate the operational understanding of NOVAHID. For full details, the reader is referred to 4] 6]. In payments processing, a transaction is asserted asynchronously by a customer. The transaction requires nite processing time at a banking node and, often, it may require to be forwarded to other banking nodes for further processing. NOVADIB 6] models the transaction processing as an distributed discrete-event simulation wherein every transaction constitutes an event. In general, a distributed discrete-event simulation algorithm may execute into a deadlock when, in a system consisting of feedback loops, the execution of an event may not generate a subsequent event. This is a likely scenario in payments processing when the execution of a transaction does not a ect a bank's net asset. For instance, when a check, drawn on bank A and pertaining to the account of a di erent person, is deposited by an individual into his/her account, also with bank A, the reserve account balance of bank A with the equivalent Federal Reserve banking node would remain una ected. Under such circumstances, a subsequent event may not be generated following the execution of this payment. By design, NOVADIB avoids deadlock and achieves the successful distributed execution of the transactions. The NOVADIB 6] algorithm is organized into three distinct subsections { s-function, puc-function, and ppc-function. The primary goal of the s-function is to execute the payment-processing operations such as credit, debit, and updating balances. The s-function is incapable of accurately determining when an event may be executed. The puc-and ppcfunctions determine when the actual execution of the s-function may be permitted, in a deadlock-free manner, and ensure the correctness of the event corresponding to the s-function. The puc-and ppc-functions, collectively, constitute the data-ow network and are also referred to as pc-functions. Figure 2 (a) presents a network of two nodes { A and B. The s-function represents the executable simulation models. Figure 2(b) shows the corresponding data-ow network in NOVADIB 6] . A and B are either both Int-Nodes or both group-nodes of a group. In Figure 2 The data-ow network in Figure 2 (b) is synthesized as follows. First, the feedback arc set for the network is identi ed. For the network in Figure 2 (a), the feedback arc set is say the solid line from the output of B to the input of A. Then, an acyclic circuit, i.e. without any loops, is obtained by severing the solid line. Two copies of the acyclic circuit are then connected through a crossbar switch. The acyclic circuits on the left and right of the crossbar switch are termed pc-and puc-functions respectively and their components (mathematical entities) are marked fA 0 , B 0 g and fA, Bg. For the network in Figure 2 (a), the crossbar switch reduces to a single connection from B 0 to A. An event at a banking node may either refer to an externally asserted transaction or an event asserted from a subsequent node. The solid line input to a node from another node represents the ow of events from a subsequent node. The unconnected solid line represents external while the dotted input line refers to the ow of acknowledgements. The head of the event queue at a node say A, is represented through the symbol U A and is referred to as the U value. It signi es the time of assertion of the transaction that must be processed next. and W values set to in nity so that they may not in uence other W 0 and W computations. A quantity, K, is computed utilizing the accurate W values of the puc-function. When the K value for a node exceeds the U value at the node, the event at the head of the event queue for that node is executed. This condition implies that there is no transaction whose in uence at the node can precede the execution of the event at the head of the event queue. When a component of either the pc-or puc-function computes the W 0 or W value at its output line, any change from its previous value will trigger the W 0 or W computation of the subsequent component(s). Consider the international payments processing network in Figure 1 . It consists of three groups, each in turn, consisting of 2 group-nodes. The top-level-network consists of the three Int-Nodes { Node-U, Node-E, and Node-J. While Figure 3 presents the s-function and data-ow network for the execution of the top-level-network in NOVADIB, Figure 4 describes that for the United States group-network. When a local transaction is asserted at group-node or an international transaction is asserted at a Int-node, the s-function for the node executes. It initiates the executions of the corresponding puc-and ppc-functions, and then disengages itself. or W values change. Then, the pc-and puc-functions propagate an acknowledgement to the s-function, following which the s-function determines whether the K value at the node exceeds the U value. If the result of the comparison is a rmative, the transaction is executed. Where a new event is generated, it is asserted at the subsequent node. Upon receipt of the new event, the subsequent node propagates back an acknowledgement. The original node receives the acknowledgement, removes the executed transaction from the event queue, and updates the U value. The updating is associated with another round of execution of the pc-and puc-functions and the W 0 and W values are updated. The process continues until all externally asserted events at the nodes are exhausted. It is noted that while new events and changes in W 0 and W are propagated from left to right, acknowledgements propagate in the reverse direction.
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Execution of International Transactions
A local transaction, i.e. one whose in uence is limited to the group, is processed by the corresponding NOVADIB algorithm. In contrast, international transactions require the execution of the NOVADIB algorithm corresponding to the group-network where the transaction originates, the NOVADIB algorithm in the top-level-network, and the NOVADIB algorithm corresponding to the group-network where the transaction terminates. In addition, transaction and account information are transferred between the group-nodes and Int-nodes. Within each group-network, each of the group-nodes maintain the most recent balances of all banks served by the group-network. Each of the Int-Nodes maintain the most recent aggregate balances for all of the participating groups. Thus, in Figure 1 , each of Node-U, Node-J, and Node-E carry the aggregate balances for Japan, US, and UK. While a local transaction may a ect the account balances of one or more banks served by the group-network and, therefore, the balances of the group-nodes, an international transaction may a ect the account balances of individual banks, group-nodes, and Int-nodes. For simplicity and without any loss in generality, this paper assumes that the international transactions are simple credits. That is, a credit is issued by a bank within a group-network for a destination account in a di erent groupnetwork. The originating bank's balance is assumed to be automatically debited for the amount of the transaction. Upon successful completion, an international transaction in this paper, adds to the balance of the destination account. Simple debit transactions may be implemented as follows. Within a group-network, a debit transaction is processed identical to a credit transactions except that a test is conducted to verify that there is su cient balance in the account and, if true, the balance is reduced by the dollar amount. If the balance is insu cient, the transaction fails. International debit transactions are executed identical to international credit transactions with one exception. The transaction is rst processed within the group-network, say \A", where it originates and is propagated to the Int-node for \A." Within the top-level-network, the transaction is processed. If the aggregate balance of the group-network, say \B," that serves the payer bank is inadequate, the transaction fails immediately. If the balance of \B" is adequate, a subsequent event, \e," of the transaction propagates to the Int-node of \B." This event causes an event to be propagated to \B" to ensure that the payer account balance is adequate. If the result is positive, the payer account balance is debited and \e" is executed. If, however, the payer account balance is insu cient, a subsequent event is generated to undo the e ect of \e" at the top-level-network. Other, more complex transactions may be synthesized from a combination of simple credit and simple debit transactions. When a transaction, I i , is asserted at a group-node by a bank, rst the corresponding NOVADIB algorithm determines that I i is an international transaction. Then, it ensures that I i is processed in the correct order, i.e. with respect to the time of assertion, with respect to other international transactions within the group-network. Next, I i is propagated from the group-node to the corresponding Int-Node, say Node U, of the top-level-network. At the top-level-network, the NOVADIB algorithm guarantees the execution of I i in the correct order with respect to all other transactions within the top-level-network. When the execution of I i at the top-level-network is complete, the aggregate balance for the group with Int-Node Node J say, is updated in each of the Int-Nodes { Node J, Node U, etc. Next, the transaction is propagated to the Japan group-network so as to update the appropriate destination account. Thus, the execution of I i involves the asynchronous, concurrent, and cooperative executions of the NOVADIB algorithms corresponding to two group-networks and the top-level-network.
Modeling NOVAHID On A Loosely-Coupled Parallel Processor System
To study the performance issues through simulation, NOVAHID is modeled on a testbed namely, a network of workstations, con gured as a loosely-coupled parallel processor system. The testbed closely resembles reality in that an international banking network will constitute a geographically distributed network of asynchronous, concurrent, and cooperative computing units. Every processor in the loosely-coupled parallel processor is independent, asynchronous, concurrent, and maintains privacy of its own data except when it communicates information to other processors through messages. An additional bene t of the testbed is that unlike a uniprocessor, the loosely-coupled parallel processor is expected to deliver simulation results quickly. The modeling of NOVAHID on the testbed, however, poses the following problem. Within every group-network, the external transactions asserted by the local customer and the transactions asserted by the top-level-network (corresponding to international transactions generated in other group-networks) constitute the input stimulus. The corresponding NOVADIB algorithm guarantees that every external transaction as well as events, generated subsequently as a result of execution of the transactions, are executed correctly. Since every NOVADIB algorithm instance is asynchronous, i.e. it executes as fast as possible, and the rate of its progress is a function of the speed of the underlying processors, the necessary and su cient conditions for the guarantee are as follows: (i) The list of transactions must be logically consistent at every time instant, and (ii) The list of events at a group-node must never be empty except when all events that should have been executed at the group-node have, in fact, been executed. If it so happens that an event, with assertion time t 1 , is on its way from the top-level-network to be executed at a group-node when the event queue at the group-node becomes empty the NOVADIB algorithm will erroneously interpret that the group-node has completed execution. Also, if the event arrives too late, i.e. after the group-network has already executed other transactions with assertion times greater than t 1 , NOVADIB will yield errors. In the distributed simulation, while all external transactions from local banks to a group-network may be made available to the appropriate group nodes, the corresponding NOVADIB has no a priori knowledge of the international transactions that originate in other group-networks and arrive subsequently as new events. The same problem plagues the NOVADIB algorithm for the top-level-network, i.e. it has no a priori knowledge of the international transactions that originate in the di erent group-networks. Without the knowledge, it is di cult for the NOVADIB algorithm at the top-level-network to guarantee the accuracy of every transaction. Thus, if two international transactions, I 1 and I 2 , originating at two di erent group-networks, should be asserted to the top-level-network at simulation times t 1 and t 2 (> t 1 ) respectively, based on their assertion times, the delays due to the processing nodes, and the propagation delays of the links, I 2 may arrive earlier than I 1 in the simulation, causing a discrepancy. It is pointed out that this problem is solely an artifact of the distributed implementation of NOVAHID on a looselycoupled parallel processor. First, di erent processors may execute and communicate at di erent speeds. Second, the clocks in the di erent parallel processors are not synchronized. Third, in the current implementation, all external transactions to a group-node are stored in its event queue. In reality, however, the clocks at all banking nodes will be synchronized to the Coordinated Universal Time, UTC 13] , such that each one of them will refer to the same \Universal Time" at the same instant. Every transaction will be ordered in time, i.e. time-stamped, by the absolute (UTC) value of its arrival time at a node. In addition, in an actual international banking network, the assertion of external transactions to the group-nodes must be implemented through independent processes that will continue to execute inde nitely along with the NOVADIB algorithms. These processes will receive the external transactions from the customers, asynchronously. Thus, none of the NOVADIB algorithms executing either the group-network or toplevel-network, will either erroneously receive out-of-order transactions or misinterpret the termination of a group-node. Consequently, transactions will be executed in the correct order, on all of the networks. For a better appreciation of the problem stated earlier, consider the following scenario. Ideally, a transaction received at t = t 1 , at a node, must be considered to have arrived earlier than a transaction received at the same node at t = t 2 (> t 1 ). That is, the time of arrival of a transaction at a node must determine its assertion time. In the simulation on the loosely-coupled parallel processor, however, given the lack of a one-to-one correspondence between the actual arrival times of the messages at the destination nodes and the simulation times at which they are launched by the sending nodes, the notion of simulation time is encapsulated in a eld associated with each transaction. Therefore, when a message arrives at a node, its assertion time is given by the contents of the eld in the message. Now, when a network, \A", receives a transaction, \T", with an assertion time of t 1 from a di erent network, \B", the assertion time, t 1 , that was valid in \B" is no longer applicable within \A". The reason is as follows. Assume that the nodes within \A" execute much faster than those within \B." Thus, within \B" transactions at times greater than t 1 may have already been executed. The arrival of \T" at \A" may cause it to be executed out of order with respect to other transactions within \A" leading to erroneous results. This paper proposes a mechanism to resolve this discrepancy by enforcing a common and uniform notion of simulation time across all group-networks and top-level-network. This will guarantee that all externally applied local and international transactions and the events, generated subsequently, are executed in the correct order, regardless of their origin. First, every group-network must be arti cially forced to await the arrival of a subsequent international transaction, if any, before removing the previously executed international transaction and initiating the execution of other transactions. Otherwise, as stated earlier, the event queue for the appropriate group-node may either become empty or contain out-of-order events, thereby causing the NOVADIB algorithm to generate errors. This scheme of enforcing waiting is termed rst \enforced wait." Second, every group-network that may receive subsequent events due to international transactions originating in other group-networks, must be aware a priori, i.e. supplied by the user statically, of the number of such transactions. It is noted again that these requirements are simply artifacts of the distributed simulation and are absolutely unnecessary in an actual distributed international payments processing system.
For the top-level-network, the exact number of international transactions expected from each of the group-networks must also be known a priori. This information is statically stored in a le by the user and is read prior to initiating simulation. Furthermore, at the top-level-network, a second \enforced wait" prevents the initiation of the NOVADIB algorithm until at least one international transaction has been asserted at every Int-Node that expects one or more international transactions based on the a priori information. At every Int-node, if the event queue is empty following the completion of execution of an internation transaction but more international transactions are expected, a third \enforced wait" prevents the NOVADIB algorithm from erroneously concluding the termination of the Int-node.
Modeling in NOVAHID
The representative international banking network in Figure 1 is modeled in NOVAHID and its operational details are explained for a given set of transactions, tabulated in Table 1 . Assume that each group-network has a maximum of 9 accounts. A total of 4 transactions are considered, originating at the group-nodes, NYC (New York City), Phila (Philadelphia), London, and Tokyo. The nal account destinations for these transactions are coded as follows. Where a destination account value lies in the range 0 through 9, the transaction is referred to as local, i.e. it is restricted to the group-network where it originates. The rst digit of a two-digit destination code refers to the group-network, where 1, 2, and 3 refer respectively to USA, UK, and Japan. The second digit of the destination code refers to the actual account number within the appropriate group-network. Thus, transactions 1 and 2 originate from the USA group-network and are destined for accounts #0 and #5 within the UK group-network. Transaction 3, a local type, is destined for account #0. Transaction 4, originate in the Tokyo group-node of the Japan group-network and is destined for account #2 of the UK group-network. Furthermore, a propagation delay is associated with every pair of group-nodes and it encapsulates the physical time required for a transaction to be processed by the computing entity at the sending node plus the time to propagate to the receiving node. Evidently, the propagation time within a group-network, assumed 20 time units in this paper, is, in general, smaller than the corresponding time, i.e. 50 time units, for the top-level-network. In this paper, a transaction is represented by a triple { fOrigin, Time, Account Destinationg. The Time eld, as also all assertion times, are speci ed in simulation time units. To facilitate understanding, rst, each of the group-networks are examined. Then, the processes within the top-levelnetwork are analyzed.
US group-network:
There are two transactions to consider namely, fNYC,70,20g and fPhila,40,25g. As evident from their destination accounts, they are both international type. Recall that, given a transaction pending for execution with assertion time, t = t d , at any given node in a group-network, its execution is permitted as long as there does not exist a transaction at another node with an assertion time less than (t d -20). Thus, fNYC,70,20g may be executed provided that there does not exist a pending transaction at Phila with an assertion time less than 70 -20 = 50 time units. This, however, is false and fNYC,70,20g may not be executed immediately. The execution of the transaction, fPhila,40,25g, on the other hand, may proceed since there does not exist at NYC a transaction with assertion time less than 40 -20 = 20. Note that the US group-network does not expect any international transactions to be asserted at it. Therefore, execution of fPhila,40,25g results in the subsequent propagation of an event fPhila,60,25g to N U, the corresponding Int-Node of the US group-network. Then, fNYC,70,20g, the only remaining transaction, is executed and the event, fNYC,90,20g is propagated to N U.
UK group-network:
Although there is a single transaction, it is not executed since the group-network, upon accessing and reading the external le, realizes that it expects two international transactions to be asserted at its input. Therefore, this groupnetwork is forced by the rst \enforced wait" to remain idle until at least one of the two international transaction have been received.
Japan group-network:
Since there is only one international transaction in this network, fTokyo,40,20g is permitted to execute and propagate a subsequent event, i.e. fTokyo,60,20g to N J, the Int-Node corresponding to the Japan group-network.
Operation of the overall NOVAHID Model
Each of the ten steps, STEP 0 through STEP 9, are illustrated through Figures 5 through 14. STEP 0:
At the start of the simulation, transaction packet \1" is asserted at NYC group-node of the US group-network, while transaction packet \2" is asserted at the Phila group-node. Transaction packet \3" is asserted at the London group-node of the UK group-network and \4" is asserted at Tokyo node of the Japan group-network. STEP 1: With the exception of \3," that is forced to wait until the arrival of at least one of the two expected international transactions at UK group-network, all transactions are executed and the subsequent events are propagated to the top-level-network. The subsequent events from \1," \2," and \4" are referred to as event packets \1," \2," and \4" respectively. A subsequent event, following the execution of a transaction, refers to a change in the account balance. While this is true for the simple credit type transactions, in general, for complex debit-credit transactions, a subsequent event may not be always generated. STEP 2:
As events with the lowest assertion times, \2" and \4" are executed at N U and N J respectively. Their assertion times are increased by the propagation delay, 50, and then propagated to the subsequent Int-Node in the top-level-network. Event packet\2" is propagated to N E and \4" to N U. STEP 3:
Next, transaction packet \1," with the lowest assertion time, is executed in the top-level-network. The subsequent event's assertion time is increased by 50 time units and then propagated to N E. STEP 4: Then, event packets \2" and \4" are executed at N E and N U respectively. The packet \2" is subsequently propagated to the London group-node and Int-node, N J. The event packet \4" is propagated to N E following its execution at N U. STEP 5:
The packet \1" is executed at N E and is propagated to the London group-node and Int-node, N J. Similar to packet \2" in STEP 4, the event packet \1" has nally reached its destination within the UK group-network. The event packet \2" is executed at London and the balance of account #5 of London group-node is 10. STEP 6: With the arrival of event packet \1" for account #0, transaction \3" within the UK group-network is nally allowed to execute. The new balance for account #0 is 5. STEP 7: Event packet \2" is executed at N J and also propagated to N U. Next, event packet \1" is executed at acct #0 within the UK group-network and hence bringing the balance of acct #0 in UK up to 25. Then, event packet \4" is executed at N E and and the subsequent event packet is sent to the UK group-network as well as Int-node N J.
STEP 8:
Event packet \1" is executed at the UK group-network, and N J. The execution of \1" at N J is followed by the its subsequent propagation back to N U. STEP 9: At this point, event packets f1g, f2g and f4g have been respectively returned to the originating nodes and are removed. Event packet \3" has been removed earlier following its execution and the subsequent update of account #0 within the UK group-network. Within the UK group-network, account #5 is updated to a new balance of 10 when it receives fN U,160,5g, the subsequent event generated from transaction fPhila,40,25g. The account #0 is updated, following the enforced wait only when the event fN U,190,0g is asserted. First, the transaction fLondon,50,0g, with the lowest assertion time, is executed. Then, the events fN U,190,0g and fN J,210,0g are executed given the lack of transactions asserted at the Glasgow group-node. At the end of the simulation, the nal balance of account #0 at both London and Glasgow group-nodes will be 55. As indicated earlier, corresponding to a change in the balance of account #0, due to execution of an event at the London group-node, a subsequent event is propagated to the Glasgow group-node. 
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-"3" executed at acct #0 of UK national network It may be observed that, for di erent network sizes, the CPU times corresponding to 1000 and 2000 transactions are fairly constant. Even for 5000 transactions, the CPU times for the 2 3 and 3 3 models are similar. However, for the 2 4 model and for 5000 transactions, the CPU time is signi cantly larger. It may be noted that the CPU times for 5000 transactions, reported in the graphs, are estimates from the runtime of the processors and may well be larger than the actual values. That is, the results reported here are pessimistic in nature. The time required for the simulation with 5000 transactions exceeds the maximum limit of the C function, \clock()," utilized to measure the CPU time of a processor. With increasing number of international transactions, the larger 2 4 model is likely to require greater CPU time to process the transactions than the 2 3 model, as observed in Figure 15 (c). The 2 4 model may be conceptually thought of as the 2 3 model with an additional group-network. However, the addition of a group-node to the groupnetworks, as in the 3 3 model relative to the 2 3 model, does not appear to require appreciably larger CPU time. Thus, in NOVAHID, the addition of a group-network has greater impact on the performance than the size of the individual group-networks.
Total Time required for International Transactions
This section details the performance analysis of the international transactions through the following experiments. In these, only international transactions are asserted at the group-nodes. A total of 20 transactions are marked for use in the measurements. These transactions originate from a speci c node \A" of a group-network, \X" and are destined for a speci c node \B" of a di erent group-network \Y." Note that in all of the three representative networks, there are at least three group-networks and \X" and \Y" are so chosen that the Int-Node for \Y" is one Int-node distance away from the Int-Node for \X." This imposes signi cant activity at the top-level-network for each of the marked transactions. The average number of unmarked international transactions between two consecutive marked transactions is modeled by the symbol load var, whose value also re ects the volume of transactions. Consider two marked international transactions with assertion times of t a and t g , where t g > t a . A load var value of 5 implies an average of 5 unmarked international transactions with assertion times ranging between t = t a and t = t g . It implies an unstable scenario in that transactions, asserted to the network later in simulation time, may fail to execute. This e ect is again an artifact of the distributed simulation and is principally due to the slow communications speed between the processors, relative to the frequent assertion of international transactions. It is pointed out that the workstations are connected through Ethernet hardware. Every international transaction involves multiple events, many of which transcend the boundaries of the group-networks. Given the slow communication, their processing is slow and time consuming. When the frequency of assertion of international transactions is high, relative to the communication, the overall e ect is that new assertions are asserted before the previous ones are completed. In an actual international processing system, conceivably, the ratio of local to international transactions will, in general, be high. Therefore, every node will execute many national transactions, that are substantially faster, between two consecutive international transactions. Furthermore, high capacity ber optics and specialized communications hardware promises faster message passing mechanisms in the future. In any event, the real-time performance of an actual implementation, i.e., the volume of transactions processed per unit time, will be limited by the speed of message communication.
To resolve this limitation, the rate of assertion of the international transactions to NOVAHID is slowed down through the use of the Unix \sleep" function. Following the execution of every transaction, marked and unmarked, each node is forced to \sleep," i.e. remain idle, for a speci c number of time units. The correspondence between the values of the sleep factor, utilized in the simulation, and those that are likely to be realistic for an actual implementation, is not known at this time. In this experiment, the values chosen for the sleep factor varies from 0 to 15 seconds. In the graphs in Figure 16 , the transactions are asserted as fast as possible and, therefore, they pertain to the value of the sleep factor equal to 0. 
Limitations of NOVAHID
An underlying assumption in this paper is that the banking network is secure and that transactions are not lost due to congestion and link failures. Clearly, since links may fail, the NOVAHID approach is limited. The authors are presently engaged in investigating new algorithms for dynamic and distributed self-healing in the event of link failures.
Conclusion
This paper has introduced a novel architecture for asynchronous, hierarchical, international, geographically-distributed, real-time banking, NOVAHID. NOVAHID is organized as a hierarchical approach. This paper has assumed that, for economic, cultural, and geo-political reasons, the world's nations are organized into unique and autonomous entities, termed groups. The lower level of the hierarchy consists of discrete \group-networks" where each group-network is synthesized from the equivalent Federal Reserve banking nodes of the nations served by the group-network. At the highest level of the hierarchy, representative entities of the groups are interconnected through a \top-level-network." The speed of local transaction processing, i.e. within a group-network, is likely to be much faster than the processing of international transactions that involve two group-networks and the top-level-network. The hierarchy re ects the underlying assumption that while a signi cant fraction of all transactions are local to the group-networks, a relatively small number of transactions transcend group boundaries. At its core, NOVAHID utilizes the principles of YADDES which embodies the principle of asynchronous, discrete event simulation algorithm for cyclic circuits and mathematically guarantees the accuracy of the execution of events. Each banking transaction may be modeled as an event in discrete event simulation. NOVAHID guarantees the accuracy of every transaction and, hence, the accurate balance of every account at all times. As a result, banks will no longer be exposed to the risk of fraudulent or bad credits, and users are not denied complete access to their most recent balances. Unlike batch-mode processing, where no new transactions may be introduced after the normal operation hours so that accuracy in book-keeping may be maintained, NOVAHID o ers to any user, perhaps, for the rst time, the banking privileges of withdrawal, deposit, and transfer anytime, anywhere in the world. This paper has also described a model and implementation of NOVAHID on a loosely-coupled parallel processor. Performance measures, obtained from simulating a few representative international payment networks, as a function of the number and composition of transactions and network complexity, have also been reported.
